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The series of lectures on eminent members of the Bar
which The Law School is sponsoring, and which began

Tappan Gregory's lecture

with Mr.

on

"Stephen Strong

continued during the Winter Quarter.
Gregory,"
Mr. John C. Slade, of Winston, Strawn, Smith and Patter
son, spoke on "Silas H. Strawn." Mr. Slade was a partner
of the late Mr. Strawn for many years and as such was
uniquely qualified to present a balanced portrait of Silas
Strawn's great contribution, both to the Bar and to society
was

generally.

Mr. Slade's

address will be found elsewhere in

this issue of the Record.
Prior

to

the lecture, which

was

presented

in Breasted

Hall, the Faculty was host at a dinner in Mr. Slade's honor
in the Quadrangle Club.
The next lecture in the series will be delivered by Mr.
Henry F. Tenney, JD '15, of Tenney, Sherman, Bentley
and Guthrie, Chicago. Mr. Tenney will speak on his father,

Tenney, in Breasted Hall, Fifty-eighth Street
and University Avenue, on Monday, April 22, at 8:30 P.M.
Horace Kent

At the dinner preceding the Slade

fessor

Soia

Mentschikoj[,

The court's

their duties
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of controlling shareholders

to

sell their shares does

not

in

intending to loot
the corporation. Furthermore, general principles of negli
gence may be invoked if reasonable inquiry has not been

clude freedom

to

sell

to one

known

be

to

made in the face of circumstances which would suggest
to a reasonable man the likelihood of such intentions.
In these cases recovery is measured by the loss to the

corporation, although in the Gerdes case the court also re
quired accounting for the excessive portion of the sale
price as a separable consideration for sale of control.
There are two other cases imposing liability on sellers of
control which are more difficult to classify and which
arguably afford some basis for a broader rule of liability.
The first of these is Commonwealth T. 1. & T. Co.
227 Pa. 410

(1910).

The defendant

corporation; he had

no

substantial

v.

Seltzer,

of a hotel

president
stockholding and was
purchase the corporate

was

approached by interests desiring to
property. Although knowing that
willing to sell," he led the outsider

"his company was
to believe that the

property was not [or sale and then formed a plan to acquire
the controlling shares and sell them to the outsider at a
profit. It was part of the plan that the purchaser would then
acquire the corporate property. This plan was carried out
with the help of the co-defendant director. The defendants
remained corporate officers after the resale of the shares
and acted as such in the sale of the corporate property. The
price paid for the property was "not found to be inade

quate." The defendants were required to account to the
plaintiffs (apparently shareholders who did not sell out) for
the fraction of their profits allocable to the plaintiffs' shares.

as

theory

Lecture, Laird Bell, JD '07,

and John D.

was

officers

Black,

Pro

with law students.

that the defendants had violated

by making

profit

a

in connection

with the sale of corporate property; the stock transactions
were viewed as mere devices to
appropriate a part of the
consideration for the property. The relief was given "on the

peculiar facts" of the case, with "full and express recogni
tion of the general rule that a stockholder, even though he
be one of the managing officers
has the right to buy
and sell its stock and to keep any profits which he may thus
acquire."
...

,

Suppose, however, that the defendants had owned the

controlling shares from the outset and that they had frankly
rejected the offer for the corporate assets in order to realize
more
through the sale of their shares at a premium. Would
be
they
required to account? No confident answer can be
drawn from the Seltzer opinion.
The other case which is difficult to classify is Perlman v.
Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn., 1952), 219 F. zd
173 (C.A. zd, 1955). Here a 37 per cent block of shares of
Newport Steel Corporation

was sold in 1950 to a
group
of industrial users of steel at $20 per share when recent
market sales had not exceeded $12. The purchasers were
concededly interested in securing supplies of steel in the
tight Korean war market. Steel price levels were being
maintained by voluntary "controls," but steel companies,
including Newport, had found ways to realize advantages
in allocating their production, including interest-free loans
from customers. The plaintiffs contended that the defend
ant's sale constituted an appropriation of the value of these
advantages. The district court dismissed the action after
trial, but the court of appeals reversed (Swan,]., dissent
ing). The court said:

We do

dispose

having to

suggest that a majority stockholder cannot
block of stock to outsiders without
his corporation for profits or even never do

not mean to

of his

controlling

account to

